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Abstract 
In this paper we present an analysis of the commodification of knowledge and information in 
contemporary capitalism. We provide a consistent account of how information as a 
commodity effects the workings of both capitalism and of Marxist theory. The first part of the 
paper critically revisits Marx’s own writings on the commodification of knowledge and how the 
immaterial labour hypothesis initially interpreted these writings. Based on the new categories 
knowledge-commodity and knowledge-rent, we then present our own approach in response 
to the challenges raised by the immaterial labour hypothesis. Lastly, we analyse the more 
recent contributions on the commodification of knowledge and information within the Marxist 
literature. The current debate on the value of knowledge has been divided between two 
camps: the reproduction cost approach, and the average cost approach. At the end of the 
paper we present empirical estimates of the magnitudes of knowledge-rents. 
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Introduction 
 
The commodification of knowledge and information has been an undeniable 
feature of our economic system. Copyrights, patents, and intellectual property rights have 
proliferated worldwide in the past decades (OECD 2013). The commodity form thus 
appears to spare nothing and no one. 
At every point in time in the history of capitalism when the commodity form took 
hold of a new economic object, a profound transformation would ensue. When the 
commodity form took hold of land, capitalist land rents emerged. When the commodity 
form took hold of labor power, wage labor and wages emerged. When the commodity 
form took hold of capital, interest-bearing capital emerged. Now we claim that when the 
commodity form took hold of knowledge and information, knowledge-rents emerged. 
In this paper we present an analysis of the commodification of knowledge and 
information in contemporary capitalism. Our approach aims primarily at developing 
Marxist theory so that it can face the new challenges posed by the existence of 
commodified information. In the 19th century Marx himself developed some deep insights 
on the future of science and information as productive forces within capitalism. Marx, 
however, had not yet experienced the vast and profound commodification of knowledge 
we experience nowadays. This fact bears consequences for the Marxist tradition, and it is 
our current task to provide a consistent account of how information as a commodity 
effects the workings of both capitalism and Marxist theory.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we will critically revisit Marx’s own 
writings on the importance of knowledge in production and how the immaterial labor 
hypothesis initially interpreted these writings. In revisiting Marx’s insights on the roles 
of science and the “general intellect” we will be able to see how he foresaw the production 
and distribution of wealth in a future stage of capitalism. The immaterial labor hypothesis 
originally raised the argument that capitalism has been going through a structural shift by 
relying ever more on immaterial commodities produced during non-labor time. The 
hypothesis of a supposed change in the nature of both labor and commodities began to 
question abstract labor as the substance of value, and as a consequence called into 
question the analytical validity of Marx’s value theory.  
Second, we present our own approach in response to the challenges raised by the 
immaterial labor hypothesis. We introduce new Marxist categories with the explicit 
purpose of theorizing the emergence of commodified information: knowledge-
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commodities with zero value, knowledge-rents, and knowledge-lords. Crucial to our 
argument is Marx’s distinction between production and reproduction time, and between 
productive and unproductive activity. Our own approach, we claim, coherently integrates 
Marx’s value theory with the transformation of knowledge and information into 
commodities.  
Third, we analyze the more recent contributions on the commodification of 
knowledge within the Marxist literature. The current debate on the value of knowledge is 
divided between two camps: the reproduction cost approach (of Teixeira and Rotta), and 
the average cost approach (of Starosta and Fuchs). The reproduction cost approach claims 
that commodified knowledge tends to have zero value because of its costless 
reproduction. The average cost approach, on the contrary, claims that commodified 
knowledge has value and that its value is given by the initial expenditures necessary to 
produce it. We argue that the reproduction cost approach is theoretically superior to the 
average cost approach, as only the zero-value interpretation is consistent with the notion 
of moral (i.e. value) depreciation. We also present empirical estimates of the magnitudes 
of knowledge-rents, and then conclude the paper with final remarks on artificial 
intelligence and the limits of the Marxist theory of value. 
 
Cognitive capitalism and the immaterial labor hypothesis 
 
 In an insightful passage in the 1857-1858 Grundrisse, a passage that did not 
reappear afterwards in any edition of Capital, Marx has an intriguing comment on the 
impact of technology and science on the limits of value as the form of wealth in 
capitalism. He explicitly posits that labor time is the measure of value. But then 
acknowledges that technology and science applied to production progressively render 
labor time a miserable measure of wealth. It is a lengthy passage but well worth quoting 
in full: 
 
But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes 
to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the 
power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose “powerful 
effectiveness” is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent 
on their production, but depends rather on the general state of science and on the 
progress of technology, or the application of this science to production. […] Real 
 
 
3 
 
wealth manifests itself, rather – and large industry reveals this – in the monstrous 
disproportion between the labour time applied, and its product, as well as in the 
qualitative imbalance between labour, reduced to a pure abstraction, and the 
power of the production process it superintends. […] In this transformation, it is 
neither the direct human labour he [the worker] himself performs, nor the time 
during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive 
power … which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of 
wealth. The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is 
based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-
scale industry itself. As soon as labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great 
well-spring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and 
hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value. […] Capital 
itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labour time to a 
minimum, while it posits labour time, on the other side, as sole measure and source 
of wealth. Hence it diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase 
it in the superfluous form; hence posits the superfluous in growing measure as a 
condition – question of life or death – for the necessary. On the one side, then, it 
calls to life all the powers of science and of nature, as of social combination and 
of social intercourse, in order to make the creation of wealth independent 
(relatively) of the labour time employed on it. On the other side, it wants to use 
labour time as the measuring rod for the giant social forces thereby created, and 
to confine them within the limits required to maintain the already created value as 
value. […] The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general 
social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, 
hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the 
control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. (Marx 
[1858]1973:705-706 – emphasis in the original) 
 
 This passage from the 1857-1858 Grundrisse was unknown to readers until its 
publication in 1939. In the 1990s it then became the basis for the immaterial labor 
hypothesis of André Gorz, Toni Negri, Michael Hardt, and Maurizio Lazzarato. The core 
idea of this hypothesis is that technological progress makes labor time an inadequate 
measure of value, for the “general intellect” depends ever more on what is produced 
during non-labor time. These authors identify the “transformation” that Marx alludes to 
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as the transition from an industry-based to a service-based economy. This transition from 
industry to services is, in their understanding, the limit to value theory grounded on labor 
time. 
Negri (1991), Hardt and Negri (2001; 2004) and Lazzarato (2006) have put forth 
the argument that immaterial labor has modified the forms under which capitalist 
production takes place. Immaterial labor, they claim, produces immaterial products such 
as knowledge, information, ideas, images, affection etc. The qualities and specific 
characteristics of immaterial production tend to transform the labor process and even 
society itself as a whole. In contrast to agriculture and industry, immaterial labor emerges 
in the service sector and does not produce tangible goods. Immaterial labor blurs the 
distinction between work and non-work time and changes the nature of labor time from 
quantitative to qualitative.  
Gorz ([2003] 2010) developed a similar set of ideas under his notion of cognitive 
capitalism. According to Gorz, current production relations are more tied to the complex 
and unmeasurable dimensions of human capital than to the former tangible forms of fixed 
capital. This replacement of fixed capital by human capital occurs because capitalism has 
gradually subordinated to the profit motive the knowledge, the science, and the arts 
developed during non-work time. Gorz ([2003] 2010) also differentiates between the 
present post-Fordist worker and the former industry worker still attached to the assembly 
line. The worker typical of Fordism is an appendix to material production and its work 
time is measured in hours of repetitive physical effort.  The post-Fordist worker, on the 
contrary, is known for the qualitative aspects of its labor, for its knowledge and skills, for 
its behavior and improvisation, for its imaginative and cooperative capabilities mostly 
nurtured outside of the workplace.  
The main argument that Hardt, Negri, Lazzarato, and Gorz have raised against 
Marxist value theory is that abstract labor is no longer the substance of value.  The 
profound changes that immaterial labor has introduced into the nature of labor and 
production ended up displacing labor time as the internal regulating mechanism of 
capitalism. Immaterial labor, these authors claim, creates immaterial commodities whose 
values cannot be measured by the labor time required for their production. The 
valorization of value now depends less on unpaid labor time and hence more on the 
scientific knowledge and skills developed during non-labor time. 
Along similar lines, Paulani (2001), Fausto (2002), and Prado (2005) have 
suggested that present-day capitalism is developing under the post-large industry form, 
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in reference to a “third moment” that succeeds manufacturing and the large industry that 
Marx theorized in Capital. The crucial feature of post-large industry is that knowledge 
itself becomes a core engine of production. As capital increasingly makes labor time a 
poor measure of value, it modifies the way in which capital subjugates labor within and 
outside the production process. If previous forms of capitalism led to the formal and real 
subordination of labor to capital, capitalism now achieves a higher stage with the 
intellectual subordination of labor to capital. More recently, Virno (2007) and Vercellone 
(2007) have also developed the idea that in cognitive capitalism the general intellect 
operates as a sublation of the real subordination of labor to capital1.  
The concept of immaterial labor poses a theoretical challenge to Marxist theory. 
If abstract labor is no longer the substance of value then value has lost both its internal 
measure in labor time and its role in regulating production and exchange. One crucial 
consequence of value losing its internal measure in labor time is that the price system 
becomes more arbitrary and dependent on non-economic factors such as monopoly rights.  
In the next section we address these concerns and show how it is possible, and 
logically consistent, to remain within the Marxist theory of value while concomitantly 
acknowledging the recent transformations in capitalism. 
 
Knowledge-commodities and knowledge-rents 
 
In a more recent analysis, Teixeira and Rotta (2012), Rotta and Teixeira (2016), 
and Rotta (2018) propose a solution to the theoretical challenge inherent to the concept 
of immaterial labor. In these studies we conceptualize the role of commodified knowledge 
but we do so within Marx’s value theory, without rejecting abstract labor as the substance 
of value.  
In this regard it is crucial to distinguish between production and reproduction in 
the determination of value and socially necessarily labor time. Marx begins Capital at a 
very high level of abstraction, a stage in his theoretical exposition at which we only find 
the production of commodities. Growth, reproduction, and inter-capitalist competition 
are not yet explicitly (even though they are implicitly) included in the analysis2. But as 
                                                          
1 See Smith (2013) for a critique of Virno and Vercellone and also for a further critique against the 
immaterial labor hypothesis for not properly considering the distinction between wealth and value in 
Marxist theory. 
2 Fausto (1987a; 1987b) theorizes this distinction between implicit and explicit, or between presupposed 
and posited determinations as Marx moves from more abstract to more concrete levels of analysis.  
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soon as Marx approaches a more concrete level of analysis he progressively introduces 
the conditions of capital reproduction. At this point, once reproduction comes to the 
forefront of the theoretical exposition, there begins an important shift within Marx’s value 
theory.  
At the initial higher level of abstraction, in which only production is featured, 
commodity production determines the magnitude of values. But once reproduction is 
explicitly brought into the picture at a more concrete level of analysis, value is then 
determined by the conditions of commodity reproduction. The Marxist theory of value is 
fundamentally reliant on the difference between the production and the reproduction of 
commodities. Because of its undue focus on the very first chapters of Capital, the Marxist 
tradition has misunderstood how reproduction (not production) determines value and 
socially necessary labor time. 
Once the reproduction of capital is explicitly brought into the analysis, Marx 
posits that what determines the value of any commodity is not the socially necessary labor 
time required for its production but the socially necessary labor time required for its re-
production.  
For example, from Capital I: 
 
But in addition to the material wear and tear, a machine also undergoes what we 
might call a moral depreciation. It loses exchange-value, either because machines 
of the same sort are being produced more cheaply than it was, or because better 
machines are entering into competition with it. In both cases, however young and 
full of life the machine may be, its value is no longer determined by the necessary 
labour-time actually objectified in it, but by the labour-time necessary to 
reproduce either it or the better machine. It has therefore been devalued to a 
greater or lesser extent. (Marx [1887]1990:528 − emphasis added) 
 
From Capital II: 
 
Just as with any other commodity, so in the case of labour-power, too, its value is 
determined by the amount of labour needed to reproduce it. […] wages are the 
value of the commodity labour-power, and the latter can be determined (like the 
value of any other commodity) by the labour needed for its reproduction. (Marx 
[1893]1992, p.458-459 − emphasis added) 
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In Capital III Marx pointed to "the great difference in costs between the first 
construction of a new machine and its reproduction" ([1894]1994:199), and then claimed 
that: 
 
Once machines, factory buildings or any other kind of fixed capital have reached 
a certain degree of maturity, so that they remain unchanged for a long while at 
least in their basic construction, a further devaluation takes place as a result of 
improvements in the methods of reproduction of this fixed capital. The value of 
machines, etc. now falls not because they are quickly supplanted or partially 
devalued by newer, more productive machines, etc., but because they can now be 
reproduced more cheaply. (Marx [1894]1994:209 − emphasis added) 
 
Fluctuations in the rate of profit that are independent of changes in either the 
capital's organic components or its absolute magnitude are possible only if the 
value of the capital advanced, whatever might be the form - fixed or circulating - 
in which it exists, rises or falls as a result of an increase or decrease in the labour-
time necessary for its reproduction, an increase or decrease that is independent of 
the capital already in existence. The value of any commodity - and thus also of the 
commodities which capital consists of - is determined not by the necessary labour-
time that it itself contains, but by the socially necessary labour-time required for 
its reproduction. This reproduction may differ from the conditions of its original 
production by taking place under easier or more difficult circumstances. (Marx 
[1894]1994:237-238 − emphasis added) 
 
Apart from all the accidental circumstances, a large part of the existing capital is 
always being more or less devalued in the course of the reproduction process, 
since the value of commodities is determined not by the labor-time originally 
taken by their production, but rather by the labor-time that their reproduction 
takes, and this steadily decreases as the social productivity of labor develops. At 
a higher level of development of social productivity, therefore, all existing capital, 
instead of appearing as the result of a long process of capital accumulation, 
appears as the result of a relatively short reproduction period. (Marx 
[1894]1994:522 − emphasis added) 
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In the case of commodified knowledge, Marx’s reasoning is pushed to its limit: 
once initially produced as commodities, knowledge and information tend to require no 
labor time to be further reproduced. They become knowledge-commodities with zero 
value and the ownership of them gives rise to knowledge-rents. Examples of knowledge-
commodities are all sorts of commodified data, computer software, chemical formulas, 
patented information, recorded music, copyrighted compositions and movies, and 
monopolized scientific knowledge. Mokyr (2002) prefers to call it the “useful 
knowledge” of information, techniques, and instructions stored in technical artifacts.  
The owners of commodified knowledge, which are mostly private companies, are 
knowledge-lords, the primary appropriators of knowledge-rents. In a process analogous 
to the original enclosures of the commons in the 16th century we can now speak of the 
“new enclosures” that privatize knowledge. The new enclosures of the 21st century deny 
labor the free access to knowledge as much as the 16th century enclosures denied labor 
the access to free land (the commons) as a means of production. 
Because it produces no new value, the creation and ownership of commodified 
knowledge is actually an unproductive form of capital accumulation (Rotta 2018). 
Productive activities are those activities that create new surplus value, while unproductive 
activities are those that do not create new surplus value. Because knowledge and 
information can be reproduced without any labor, its production generates no value and 
hence no surplus value, and must therefore be classified as unproductive activity. 
A knowledge-commodity is, in all cases, a commodity. It has value and use-value 
as its social determinations. But quantitatively this value is zero, because the measure of 
value is the (zero) labor time necessary to reproduce the commodity. The knowledge-
commodity does not lose value as one of its determinations, otherwise it would cease to 
be a commodity in the first place. It is thus more accurate to speak of knowledge-
commodities with zero value than of valueless knowledge-commodities, even though we 
employ these two terms interchangeably. This is somehow analogous to a situation in 
which the temperature of an object is zero degree Celsius. The temperature as a property 
(physical, not social in this analogy) of the object is present, as the kinetic energy of its 
constituent particles, even though quantitatively the temperature on the Celsius scale is 
zero.  
A corollary of the above reasoning is that what Hardt, Negri, Lazzarato, and Gorz 
labeled as “immaterial labor” belongs mostly to the unproductive side of capitalism. 
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Commodified knowledge and information have no value and hence cannot contain any 
surplus value. The profits that accrue to knowledge owners are knowledge-rents that 
represent value drawn from other value-producing activities in the economy. This is 
consistent with Marxist value theory and thus cannot be an argument favoring the 
dismissal of labor time as the measure of value.  
The main theoretical misunderstanding of those who advocate the end of Marx’s 
theory of value is that they have not properly conceptualized the difference between 
production and re-production time, and neither the difference between productive and 
unproductive activity. Even though the language is not completely clear, Marx gave us a 
hint of this reasoning: 
 
[The] product of mental labor – science – always stands far below its value, 
because the labor-time needed to reproduce it has no relation at all to the labor-
time required for its original production (Marx [1863]1988:Addenda to Vol. 1). 
 
Once discovered, the law of the deflection of a magnetic needle in the field of an 
electric current, or the law of the magnetization of iron by electricity, cost 
absolutely nothing. […] Science, generally speaking, costs the capitalist nothing, 
a fact that by no means prevents him from exploiting it (Marx [1887]1990:508). 
 
In Capital III Marx then considers the existence of use-values that require no labor 
to be reproduced: 
 
[The] use-value is the general bearer of the exchange-value, but not its cause. If 
the same use-value could be created without labor, it would have no exchange-
value, yet it would have the same useful effect as ever (Marx [1894]1994:786). 
 
It is, nonetheless, crucial to distinguish between the knowledge-commodity itself 
and other tangible and non-tangible commodities that it might be attached to. In certain 
cases the knowledge-commodity is traded (sold or licensed) per se. Examples are when 
customers and companies purchase the license to use software, or when a company pays 
the royalties required to use a specific drug formula. But in other cases the knowledge-
commodity can only be traded if bundled together with another commodity. This situation 
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leads to a potential theoretical confusion if we do not properly distinguish the knowledge-
commodity itself from the other commodities bundled together with it.  
A few examples might clarify this instance. When a band performs a live concert 
its fans must pay for the entrance tickets. The ticket price covers the costs of all the inputs 
used such as the musical and technical equipment necessary for a live concert. The ticket 
price also covers the compensation of the productive labor of the musicians performing 
live to the public. However, the musicians are playing copyrighted compositions, and this 
is where the knowledge-rents arise. The copyrighted songs are knowledge-commodities 
and a share of the concert revenues are actually payments for the knowledge-rents 
associated with these songs. Hence, what we call a concert is in fact a bundle of several 
commodities, among them knowledge-commodities like musical compositions. The live 
performance is a combination of the productive labor of musicians and technical staff, 
plus the unproductive labor of those who composed the songs in the first place. If 
recorded, the video of the concert itself can be sold afterwards as a knowledge-commodity 
with zero value in a DVD or via Internet streaming. 
When you buy a smartphone, part of the phone price covers the production costs 
of the physical components. But another part of the price remunerates the patented design 
and the copyrighted software stored in the memory. The copyrighted parts of the phone 
are therefore knowledge-commodities, and the revenues associated with these specific 
components are knowledge-rents. This implies that your smartphone is in fact a 
combination of more than one commodity. A share of the phone price pays for the 
productive labor of those workers making the physical components. Another share of the 
phone price pays for the knowledge-rents, out of which the knowledge-lords pay for the 
unproductive labor of those workers making the design and the software3.  
Even fixed capital in the form of machines and equipment are combinations of 
different commodities. Suppose that a company takes ten years to develop a new type of 
machine capable of performing a very precise process. The physical machine does need 
labor time to the reproduced, and hence it contains value. But the copyrighted design and 
the copyrighted blueprint of the machine are the knowledge-commodities inherently 
attached to the machine itself. The same goes for any software used to operate this 
                                                          
3  Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick (2011) estimate the production costs of iPhones and iPads in 2010. They 
find that the cost of physical materials in the iPhone 4 represents only 22% of the final retail price, while 
labor costs amount to only 5.3%. They do not, however, attempt to estimate the size of the knowledge-
rents. 
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machine. This copyrighted knowledge is the knowledge-commodity that gives rise to 
knowledge-rents. Therefore, knowledge-commodities and knowledge-rents are present 
even in fixed forms of capital like machines and equipment. The physical part of this 
fixed capital suffers both use-value depreciation and value (moral) depreciation, such that 
the machine gradually transfers (and hence loses) its value to the output. But the 
copyrighted part of this fixed capital does not have value and the payments associated to 
it are knowledge-rents. 
The knowledge-commodity is not a commodity that is knowledge-intensive. The 
knowledge-commodity is not the technical artifact in which information is stored. The 
knowledge-commodity is the commodified information itself. For example, take the case 
of pharmaceuticals. A pill (the tangible drug) is not a knowledge-commodity. The 
knowledge-commodity is the information that allows the company to make the drug in 
the first place. The information that allows the pharmaceutical company to make the drug 
is a commodity because this useful information was produced with the explicit purpose 
of making a profit. Hence, this information is commodified. But because commodified 
information has zero value, it gives rise not to surplus value but to rents. For the 
knowledge-commodity to have zero value, we do not even need to wait until another 
competitor company can reproduce this drug at zero labor time. The pharmaceutical 
company that paid for all the initial sunk and fixed costs of research and development can 
itself already reproduce this commodified information at zero labor time. For a 
knowledge-commodity to have zero value is not necessary that competitors replicate it. 
The innovating company that created the knowledge-commodity in the first place can 
already reproduce this commodified information indefinitely, regardless of what its 
competitors do. 
Marx’s theory of ground rent related only to agriculture and mining (Fine 1979; 
Harvey 2006:349-357; Rigi 2014; Basu 2018). But we can now draw on his insights to 
claim the existence of four categories of knowledge-rents: 
 
(i) Monopoly Rent: Because of intellectual property rights the owner of information 
is able to price (the use of) its knowledge-commodities above their zero value, 
hence extracting a monopoly rent from its users. The intellectual property rights 
transform a non-scarce commodity into one that is artificially scarce. The 
monopoly rent exists regardless if the user of the knowledge-commodity is a final 
consumer or a company using it as an input. If the owner of the knowledge-
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commodity sells not its use rights but the actual ownership, then the price of the 
knowledge-commodity is the discounted expected stream of future knowledge-
rents. 
(ii) Differential Rent type I (DR-1): Each knowledge-commodity gives rise to 
different levels of productivity for the companies using them as inputs. If certain 
companies use a particular software to enhance their productivity, these privileged 
companies will obtain DR-1. The software gives them a concrete productive 
differential. This is analogous to lands with different levels of fertility. But if all 
companies use the same software, the productive differential is eroded and DR-1 
ceases to exist. Note that software need to be upgraded constantly but, in any case, 
each upgraded version is a new knowledge-commodity with zero value. 
(iii) Differential Rent type II (DR-2): Companies using knowledge-commodities as 
inputs do so but with different amounts of capital. If the organic composition of 
capital or the amount of capital invested across companies that use the software 
are not the same, even if all of them use the same software, DR-2 will emerge. 
(iv) Absolute Rent: Absolute rent would exist only if knowledge-commodities had 
value and were produced within a specific sector protected by intellectual property 
rights and with a lower organic composition of capital then the rest of the 
economy. Unlike monopoly rent, which draws from the global pool of surplus 
value, absolute rent draws from the surplus value in a particular sector of 
production, like land rents in the agricultural sector. Because these conditions are 
not satisfied in the case of knowledge-commodities, absolute knowledge-rents are 
implausible.4 
 
As Teixeira and Rotta (2012) and Rotta (2018) demonstrated, it is empirically 
verifiable that present-day capitalism is indeed becoming more dependent on the 
existence of rents such as land-rents and knowledge-rents. In fact, the expansion of 
unproductive activities and of rentier forms of capital is exactly what Marx had theorized 
and foreseen in the development of capitalism. There is still no need to reject labor as the 
substance of value and hence no need to reject the Marxist theory of value. On the 
                                                          
4 Zeller (2008) and Teixeira and Rotta (2012) had originally claimed that absolute knowledge-rents could 
exist, but Rigi (2014) correctly pointed out that absolute rents are not a constituent part of knowledge-rents: 
“the surplus value that is transformed into patent rent is not produced in the knowledge sector … knowledge 
has no value, and, therefore, the knowledge sector does not produce surplus value at all. This surplus value 
is produced outside the knowledge sector”. 
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contrary, the rise of rentier activities and of other types of unproductive activity is exactly 
what Marx had conceptualized through his notion of value autonomization (Rotta and 
Teixeira 2016). 
In the next section we turn to the more recent developments in the Political 
Economy literature regarding the roles of knowledge and immaterial labor. 
 
The commodification of knowledge and information: the recent literature 
  
The Political Economy literature on the commodification of knowledge and 
information has been growing steadily in the past decades. At the present moment the 
scholarship is divided between two camps in regard to the determination of the value of 
commodified knowledge. The reproduction cost approach posits that commodified 
knowledge tends to have zero value, and that knowledge-rents are appropriations of the 
global pool of surplus value in the economy. The average cost approach, on the contrary, 
posits that the initial investment necessary to create commodified knowledge (the 
research and development costs to produce the “mold”) determines the value to be 
realized once the knowledge-commodity is sold or licensed. In this section we highlight 
the advances made in this debate. Our understanding is that the reproduction cost 
approach is theoretically superior to the average cost approach because it is the only one 
that is consistent with the notion of moral (i.e. value) depreciation. 
Foley (2013) draws from the Classical Political Economy distinction between 
productive and unproductive activities to claim that commodified information contains 
no value and that its ownership gives rise to intellectual property rents. The unique feature 
of commodified information is that, unlike the case of land rents in which the same soil 
can be used for only one crop at a time, the same piece of information can be used by 
multiple parties concomitantly. Unlike land, knowledge is non-rival and hence its owner 
can extract rents multiple times over from costless copies of the same commodity. These 
rents, Foley argues, are part of a pool of surplus value generated in capitalist production 
though they have no direct relation to the exploitation of productive workers in 
themselves. The production of knowledge and the associated intellectual property rights 
allow unproductive capitalists to grab a share of the global pool of surplus value without 
directly contributing to it. Foley also notes that despite being classified as an unproductive 
activity, knowledge creation can indirectly raise the productivity of labor in productive 
activities.  
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On this same issue, Foley has a very good passage on how the creation of surplus 
value is actually an unintended by-product of the struggle to appropriate (not necessarily 
to produce) surplus value. Which implies that, in capitalism, economic growth is an 
unintended by-product of the pursuit of profits: 
 
[The] global pool of surplus value emerges from the social relations of capitalism 
as an unintended by-product of the competition to appropriate surplus value. Its 
magnitude is an emergent and contingent phenomenon beyond the influence of 
any individual capitalist, responsive only to broad political, cultural, and social 
factors. The immediate competitive challenge for all capitals is the appropriation 
of a larger share of this pool of surplus value. Some modes of appropriation 
indirectly contribute to increasing the size of the pool of surplus value, but many, 
including a wide variety of methods of generating rents, do not. There are some 
self-correcting mechanisms built into the social relations of capitalism ... If, for 
example, capitalists relentlessly shift capital from the generation of surplus value 
to the unproductive pursuit of the appropriation of surplus value, sooner or later 
profit rates in productive sectors will rise and profit rates in unproductive sectors 
will fall, according to the general law of competition (Foley 2013:261). 
  
Jeon (2011) further notes that in the Marxist tradition in South Korea there has 
been an intense debate between those who think that knowledge-commodities have value 
and those who think otherwise. Among those who believe that knowledge-commodities 
have value, the main argument is that the fixed capital and all the costs behind the 
production of the very first unit (the “mold”) must be taken into account into the unit 
values of the output. Hence, if this hypothesis is correct, the value of knowledge-
commodities is the average cost per unit produced inclusive of all sunk and fixed costs. 
Given the large expenditures with machinery, laboratories, and research and development 
that need to be spread out across all copies sold, the average cost of knowledge-
commodities cannot be zero. But such an approach ignores Marx’s value theory grounded 
on reproduction time. As we have seen in the last section, Marx was very explicit about 
the fact that reproduction, not production, determines the value of any commodity. Jeon 
(2011) also notes that in the group of Korean scholars that identify with the hypothesis 
that knowledge-commodities have zero value, there has been a convergence toward the 
idea that intellectual property rights do imply the existence of information rents. 
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Starosta (2012) and Fuchs (2015) also disagree with the notion that knowledge-
commodities have zero value. These authors believe that value is determined in a similar 
way to average costs. And because average costs are the total costs (inclusive of fixed 
costs like plants and equipment) divided by the output, the value of knowledge-
commodities is not zero. Starosta warns against attempts of determining the values of 
commodities taken individually: 
 
[The] determination of the value of the individual commodity can no longer be 
considered in isolation but must be directly posited in its organic relation to the 
mass of commodities whose unity embodies the valorization of the capital 
invested. […] the total value is determined “first” and then shared out equally by 
each individual commodity, which now contains a proportional fraction of the 
former. […] the real determination of value actually transcends the isolated single 
commodity as such. […] Inasmuch as each single commodity embodies an equal 
fraction of the value of the product of capital as a whole, the comparison between 
the (exceptionally high) cost of production of the first article and (exceptionally 
low) cost of reproduction of the rest is rendered meaningless as far as their value-
determinations are concerned. […] intellectual property rights do not force the 
exchange-value of software above its insignificantly small (or nonexistent) value 
… but mediate its full realization. […] In this sense, there is no essential difference 
between cognitive commodities and “physical” ones beyond the aforementioned 
technicality of extending the legal regulation beyond the act of exchange proper 
and into the conditions of use (Starosta 2012:373-376). 
 
 Starosta argues that the total value of the entire output must be divided across each 
unit produced. This average cost approach to the determination of value is therefore an 
attempt to remain within the boundaries of Marx’s value theory, while at the same time 
rejecting the claims that Marx’s value theory has become obsolete in cognitive capitalism. 
Starosta cites passages from Capital, mostly drawn before Marx explicitly introduces 
reproduction into the analysis, to corroborate his perspective. But ignores those that 
contradict his claims. What determines the value of any commodity is the labor time 
required to reproduce it. And this reproduction time bears no relation with the labor time 
originally required to create the commodity in the first place.  
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Marx’s value theory based on reproduction time and, consequently, on moral 
depreciation (the change in the values of the existing stock of commodities) is much more 
nuanced than a simple average cost approach. The determination of value based on the 
socially necessary labor time to reproduce a commodity is, in fact, similar to current cost 
accounting practices. A closer inspection of Marx’s quotes in the previous section of this 
paper shows that moral depreciation: 
(i) Is the loss of value that, abstracting from the physical wear and tear (the use-
value depreciation), impacts the stock of all commodities, including those that 
have already been produced in the past; 
(ii) Can occur because of the existing reproduction methods on the supply side, 
and also because of changes on the demand side; 
(iii) Can occur because reproduction time takes into account the immediate effects 
of new technologies on the obsolescence of already existing technologies;  
(iv) Can occur because of economies of scale that reduce reproduction costs as 
more output is produced, for a given technology. 
Contrary to average costs, reproduction time does not rely on the sunk and fixed costs 
originally employed in the production of the mold: “the value of the capital advanced … 
rises or falls as a result of an increase or decrease in the labour-time necessary for its 
reproduction, an increase or decrease that is independent of the capital already in 
existence” (Marx [1894]1994:237-238 − emphasis added). Reproduction time can thus 
fall to zero after the mold is produced regardless of the large amounts of fixed capital 
used in its conception.  
The immediate drop in the reproduction time of knowledge-commodities after the 
mold is created does not derive from a sudden fall in the average cost due to economies 
of scale and neither from a change in technology. The extreme case of moral depreciation 
that characterizes knowledge-commodities derives from the structure of the existing 
methods of reproduction of commodified knowledge and information. For this reason, 
moral depreciation is logically consistent only with a theory of value based not on average 
costs but on reproduction time. We do not have to claim, therefore, that knowledge-
commodities have value in order to save Marx’s value theory. 
Starosta (2012) and Fuchs (2015, chapter 5; 2017) thus disagree with the notion 
that knowledge production is a type of unproductive activity. Our claim that knowledge 
creation is an unproductive activity might indicate that the unproductive workers creating 
knowledge and information are not exploited. But this is definitely not the case: 
 
 
17 
 
 
[A]ll capitalistically employed labor is exploited by capital, whether it is 
productive labor or unproductive labor. The rate of exploitation of each is their 
respective ratio of surplus labor time to necessary labor time. […] In the case of 
productive workers, their rate of exploitation is also the rate of surplus value, since 
their surplus labor time results in surplus value (Shaikh and Tonak 1994:31). 
 
In Capital III Marx claims that by exploiting unproductive workers the 
unproductive capitalist grabs a share of the global pool of surplus value:  
 
It is only by way of its function in the realization of values that commercial capital 
functions as capital in the reproduction process, and therefore draws, as 
functioning capital, on the surplus-value that the total capital produces. For the 
individual merchant, the amount of his profit depends on the amount of capital 
that he can employ in this process, and he can employ all the more capital in 
buying and selling, the greater the unpaid labour of his clerks. The very function 
by virtue of which the commercial capitalist's money is capital is performed in 
large measure by his employees, on his instructions. Their unpaid labour, even 
though it does not create surplus-value, does create his ability to appropriate 
surplus-value, which, as far as this capital is concerned, gives exactly the same 
result; i.e. it is its source of profit. Otherwise the business of commerce could 
never be conducted in the capitalist manner, or on a large scale. Just as the unpaid 
labour of the worker creates surplus-value for productive capital directly, so also 
does the unpaid labour of the commercial employee create a share in that surplus-
value for commercial capital. (Marx [1894]1994:407) 
 
Contrary to Fuchs’s approach, and drawing from Teixeira and Rotta (2012), Rigi 
(2014) builds on the concepts of knowledge-commodities and of knowledge-rents in 
order to analyze the distribution of surplus value among different forms of intellectual 
property such as copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets. Rigi rightfully claims 
that knowledge-rents cannot be conceptualized solely within national borders, for the core 
countries are able to extract rents from the surplus value produced in peripheral regions 
of the globe. In a similar way, Seda-Irizarry and Bhattacharya (2017) conceptualize 
knowledge-rents at the level of global value chains, as rents might imply the transfer of 
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surplus from non-capitalist modes of production in peripheral countries to the capitalist 
mode of production in core countries. 
Within the Marxist tradition, an early mention of a category akin to “knowledge-
rent” is from Ernest Mandel (1975:192) in his theory of “technological rents” as the 
surplus profits derived from monopolized innovations that reduce production costs. 
Haddad (1998) uses the term “knowledge-rents” more precisely to indicate the revenues 
whose origin lies in the labor of “knowledge workers” employed at private companies. 
Perelman (2003:305) and Zeller (2008) further establish a comparison between land 
property rights and patents. But despite their insights, these authors do not develop a 
consistent value theory of knowledge-rents as we do in Teixeira and Rotta (2012) and 
Rotta (2018).  
Zeller (2008), in particular, offers an attempt at theorizing information rents 
within a Marxist framework. He posits that intellectual property rights are similar to the 
enclosure of the commons in the time of primitive accumulation. Even though claiming 
explicitly that information rents are monopoly rents, Zeller does not explicitly engage 
into a discussion of whether or not commodified information has value. Despite analogies 
to land rents and accumulation by dispossession, in his work there is no further theoretical 
development besides the claim of monopoly rents associated to patents. As we put forth, 
without a proper value theory of commodified information it is not possible to develop a 
consistent theory of information rents. Zeller (2008:97) seems to suggest that 
commodified knowledge does have value and that patents ensure the value of knowledge 
is realized, but if commodified information has value then the analogy with monopolized 
land (which does not have value) and land rents is unclear: 
 
Knowledge is a product of labor. But the problem lies in the fact that information 
and technology once produced are usually quite simple to reproduce, and therefore 
the realization of the exchange value is questioned […] The phase of producing 
knowledge and information whose acquisition will be secured based on a patent 
is normally characterized by a high share of variable capital. Therefore, a 
potentially high surplus value arises here. But it is not yet realized. (Zeller 
2008:97-99 – emphasis added) 
  
As Teixeira and Rotta (2012:456-459) explain, within a Marxist framework, 
interest is the form of revenue associated with loaned money or with licensed 
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commodities that have value. Rent, on the contrary, is the form of revenue associated with 
commodities that do not have value. Borrowed money is an amount of value and hence 
is paid back with interest. Borrowed (i.e. leased) machines and equipment have value and 
hence the lease payments are interest payments. In the case of licensed knowledge there 
is no value being borrowed, and hence the payments associated with it are not interest but 
rents instead. Unworked land yields rents to its owner because unworked land requires 
no labor to be produced (as it is a free gift from nature) and thus contains no value. 
Without a consistent value theory, as Teixeira and Rotta (2012:456-459) develop, there 
is a great risk in conflating interest and rent. 
The Political Economy notion that knowledge has zero value is featured in 
mainstream Economics, albeit under a different value theory, as the zero marginal cost 
of knowledge (Duffy 2004). Shavell and van Ypersel (2001:545) note that this special 
feature of knowledge also applies to industries producing pharmaceuticals, software, 
movies, recorded music, books, and visual products. 
Rotta (2018) is one of the yet few empirical works that attempt to estimate the 
actual size of knowledge-rents and their evolution over time. Using input-output matrices 
and national income accounts for the United States from 1947 to 2011, Rotta (2018) 
arrives at aggregate and disaggregate estimates of Marxist categories for both productive 
and unproductive activities. The rise of knowledge-rents is just one dimension within the 
larger secular trend of rising unproductive activity. Unproductive activity has been 
growing at a fast pace in terms of incomes, fixed assets, and employment. The total 
income of unproductive activities quadrupled relative to the total value generated in 
productive activities during the 1947-2011 period. The estimates reveal that knowledge 
creation and finance have been the fastest growing unproductive activities both in terms 
of net income and capital stock. As percentage shares of the net income of all 
unproductive activity within the American economy, there has been substantial growth in 
the shares of finance and insurance from 14% to 23.2%, and also in knowledge and 
information rents from 7.9% to 17.4%. Finance and knowledge-rents combined have risen 
from 21.9% to 40.5% of the net income of all unproductive activity, hence nearly 
doubling in the postwar period. As percentage shares of the net capital stock in all 
unproductive activities, the fastest growth rates in shares have been in knowledge and 
information (from 0.8% to 5.0%) and in finance and insurance (from 1.7% to 10.3%). 
Finance- and knowledge-related activities have grown their combined capital stocks six 
fold (or 502%) from 1947 to 2011 as a share of the total unproductive capital stock. 
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Robbins (2009) provides detailed estimates of corporate income of United States 
corporations from the use of intellectual property, including royalties and licensing fees. 
The evidence indicates that these transactions have been growing rapidly at 11% on 
average per year from 1994 to 2004. Robbins (2009)’s work provides further discussion 
on how intangible assets and the revenues associated with them impact official GDP 
estimates. The Bureau of Economic Analysis in the US, for example, now plans to include 
investment in intangible assets as part of GDP. 
The concepts of knowledge-commodities and of knowledge-rents can also unify 
two important branches of Marxism: the cultural industry (including digital media) and 
value theory. As Fredric Jameson noticed back in 1984, the Marxist tradition had not yet 
been able, by then, to integrate “cultural and informational commodities” with the labor 
theory of value. Our approach, we argue, bridges this gap in the Political Economy 
scholarship: 
 
This description is also quite consistent with the Frankfurt School’s conception of 
the “culture industry” and the penetration of commodity fetishism into those 
realms of the imagination and the psyche which had, since classical German 
philosophy, always been taken as some last impregnable stronghold against the 
instrumental logic of capital. What remains problematical about such conceptions 
– and about mediatory formulations such as that of Guy Debord, for whom “the 
image is the last stage of commodity reification” – is of course the difficulty of 
articulating cultural and informational commodities with the labor theory of 
value, the methodological problem of reconciling an analysis in terms of quantity 
and in particular of labor time (or of the sale of labor power in so many units) with 
the nature of “mental” work and of nonphysical and noncomensurable 
“commodities” of the type of informational bits or indeed of media or 
entertainment “products” (Jameson 1984:xi − emphasis added). 
 
In this regard, Fuchs (2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; also Fisher and Fuchs 2015) has 
done some interesting work on the production of knowledge and information in social 
media like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Myspace, WordPress etc. His argument is 
that the users themselves are producing the content of the information commodities. 
Social media companies appropriate and commodify user-generated content without 
paying for the labor time required to produce it. In return, these companies offer their 
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services without charge. Fuchs thus labels these users as prosumers: consumers that 
actually produce the content that they themselves consume. Social media companies are 
responsible for providing the digital platform, thus encoding all the content, and then 
receiving fees from advertisers.  
In spite of our theoretical disagreements in terms of value theory, Fuchs does offer 
an interesting hypothesis, namely that on social media it is the users (the prosumers) 
themselves that generate the information that is then gathered and commodified by the 
companies developing the online platforms. Wikipedia, the biggest encyclopedia in the 
history of humankind, would be another great example of user-generated content, even 
though in this particular case there is no profit motive and hence knowledge is not 
commodified. The question that remains open is if, once produced by the users 
themselves, these information commodities on social media still require labor time to be 
further reproduced. From our perspective, this user-generated content online necessitates 
labor to be produced but, once produced, necessitates no further labor to be reproduced. 
Companies like Google and Facebook can commodify the online content of their users 
but it is still a commodity with zero value. Our argument does not negate the possibility 
that the users are somehow ‘exploited’ when they generate the content online that is later 
on gathered, processed, and commodified5. It does question, however, the notion that this 
online content on social media has value. Our understanding is that commodified 
information, because of its effortless reproduction, has always zero value regardless of 
who produces it. 
 
Implications and final remarks 
 
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate on whether or not commodified knowledge 
has value, the Marxian Political Economy literature has been able to reach one consensus: 
that, contrary to the immaterial labor hypothesis, there is still no need to reject the Marxist 
value theory. The immaterial labor hypothesis has claimed that Marx’s value theory is no 
longer relevant in cognitive capitalism. In this paper we argued otherwise, namely that 
                                                          
5 Following Smith’s (2013) analysis of “free gifts” to capital, we could claim that when data are produced 
by people using computers as a by-product of their activity online, the data are provided to capital as a “free 
gift” outside the commodity form, becoming a commodity only at some later point in some other process. 
Hence, Fuchs’ notion of ‘exploitation’ of online users does not employ Max’s concept of exploitation in its 
strict sense.    
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the commodification of knowledge and information can be explained in a consistent way 
within the Marxist value theory. 
This does not mean, of course, that the Marxist theory of value faces no limits. As 
a theory that is contingent on a specific mode of production and on a specific historical 
moment, it will make evident its own constrains. One possible case, even still within the 
capitalist mode of production, is that of artificial intelligence (AI). In Marxist theory, only 
direct human labor creates new value. Machines and equipment transfer their values to 
the output but do not add any new value to it. AI could challenge this idea, for it is a non-
labor input that does create a new output not previously conceived, foreseen, or planned 
by human labor. AI implies that fixed capital itself has productive and creative powers, 
independent of the human labor originally used to program it in the first place. 
The Political Economy of knowledge commodification, however, has not yet 
reached a consensus on the status of knowledge-commodities. The reproduction cost 
approach of Teixeira and Rotta claims that knowledge-commodities tend to have zero 
value and that the commodification of knowledge leads to the formation of knowledge-
rents, drawn from the global pool of surplus value in the economy. The average cost 
approach of Starosta and Fuchs, on the contrary, claims that knowledge-commodities 
have value and that their value is determined by the initial investment in the research and 
development of the “mold”. Intellectual property rights then assure the realization of the 
value of commodified knowledge.  
Our understanding is that the reproduction cost approach is superior to the average 
cost approach for two main reasons. First, the reproduction cost approach is much closer 
to Marx’s own insights on value theory. Second, the reproduction cost approach is the 
only approach consistent with the notion of moral (i.e. value) depreciation; the average 
cost approach is not. Our empirical estimates also indicate that knowledge-rents have 
been rising both as a share of the total income of unproductive activities and relative to 
the total value created in productive activities. 
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